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LIVING UP TO AND UNDER NORMS 
Stephen R. Galoob* 
SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, 
AND THE LAW. (PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 2014). PP. 248. 
HARDCOVER $35.00. PAPERBACK $24.95. 
Seana Valentine Shiffrin is one of the most insightful philosophers of our time. 
Her book Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law is a collection of essays on a 
wide range of topics, such as the value of free speech, the wrongfulness of lying, the 
ethics of communication, and the nature of professional responsibilities. 
According to Shiffrin, the essays in Speech Matters build on common themes 
while retaining “rough independence” from each other.1 That said, several ideas in-
form Speech Matters and run throughout Shiffrin’s other major works. Part I describes 
the way that these ideas are utilized in Speech Matters. Part II identifies a distinctive 
insight that Shiffrin makes in Speech Matters and elsewhere. Put briefly, Shiffrin envi-
sions a crucial difference between the standards for living up to legal, political, and 
moral norms and the expectations that are appropriate of those who live under such 
norms. Shiffrin’s position, roughly encapsulated, is that living up to legal and political 
norms requires a kind of allegiance, while legal, moral, and political principles pre-
clude the state or others from demanding or expecting such allegiance. Shiffrin’s in-
sights in Speech Matters apply far beyond the topics discussed in the book. 
I.  SHIFFRIN ON AGENCY, INTERNALIZATION, AND ACCOMMODATION 
Rather than comprehensively summarizing Speech Matters, my goal is to examine 
how three specific topics are analyzed in the book: moral agency, the internalization 
of norms, and the limits to what states and others can demand of agents. Shiffrin 
addresses the importance of moral agency most explicitly in chapters 1 and 3. 
Shiffrin’s account of the internalization of norms is most prominent in Chapters 2 
and 6. Chapters 4 and 5 describe the limits of what may be expected of those who 
                                                          
 * Stephen Galoob is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Tulsa College of Law. Thanks to Chad 
Flanders, Andrew Gold, Ethan Leib, and Seana Shiffrin. This work was supported in part by a Dean’s summer 
research grant from the University of Tulsa College of Law.   
 1. SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW (2014) [hereinafter 
SPEECH MATTERS], at 4.  
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live under norms. While this overview leaves out many of Shiffrin’s most important 
contributions in Speech Matters, it clarifies what, in Part II, I call “Shiffrin’s Insight.” 
A. Moral Agency 
Shiffrin starts from two basic ideas: first that developing one’s moral agency is 
an important goal for any person and second that providing practices and opportu-
nities for people to develop their agency is a paramount political goal.2 Someone’s 
moral agency can only develop under specific circumstances—for example, where 
she has opportunities to interact with others and structures that facilitate these inter-
actions.3 Communicative institutions and practices are thus part of the “foundation 
of our moral agency.”4 
Concern with moral agency informs Shiffrin’s discussion of communication 
ethics. In Chapter 1, “Lies and the Murderer Next Door,” Shiffrin analyzes why lying 
is wrong, orienting her discussion around Immanuel Kant’s conclusion that it would 
be wrong “to lie to a murderer who asked us whether a friend of ours whom he is 
pursuing has taken refuge in our house.”5 Unlike other deontological strategies for 
analyzing the wrongfulness of lying, Shiffrin’s two-step argument does attempt to 
locate properties that make lying a sui generis wrong. Rather, she first identifies a core 
value of truthful communication: namely, that it is part of communicative practices 
that provide necessary opportunities for people to develop their moral agency (for 
example, by enabling people to represent their own mental states, to form reliable 
pictures of the world, and to enter into valuable relationships with others).6 Then, 
she examines how a lie might frustrate the realization of this value. A lie can harm 
others by deceiving them. Yet a lie can be wrong apart from its deceptiveness, for 
example where it reflects a “maxim for action that could not serve as a public princi-
ple of action, because it would undermine the rational reliability of warrants alto-
gether and with it, our ability to pursue our joint moral ends.”7 This feature makes 
lies a form of subversion: the lie flouts communicative norms and, in so doing, sub-
verts shared communicative practices, regardless of the lie’s empirical effect on those 
practices. Subversion violates what Shiffrin sees as a generic duty to secure and pro-
tect communicative practices, given their integral role in the development of human 
agency.8 Shiffrin’s explanation of the wrongfulness of lying to the murderer at the 
                                                          
 2. Id. at 26 (contending that “the fundamental responsibility to secure and protect the individual and social 
conditions under which we possess [moral] agency and under which we may understand and acquit our moral duties 
exerts a lexical priority” over other social goals.) 
 3. Id. at 104 (emphasizing the importance of “externalizing mental content and interacting with other thinkers 
as a method of developing one’s mental capacities.”).   
 4. Id. at 26.  
 5. Id. at 5 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, On A Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 
611 (Mary Gregor ed., trans., 2005) (8:425) (internal citations omitted).  
 6. SPEECH MATTERS, supra note 1, at 9-12.  
 7. Id. at 24.  
 8. Id. at 8 (“The conditions of forging moral progress together seem to depend upon securing and protecting 
the lines of communicative trust.”).  
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door is based on the duty to secure and protect these valuable social practices,9 a duty 
that seemingly generalizes to any social institution or practice whose operation is in-
tegral to moral agency. 
The vital role for social institutions and practices in the development of moral 
agency also underlies Shiffrin’s case for free speech in Chapter 3, “A Thinker-Based 
Approach to Freedom of Speech.” According to Shiffrin, free speech is an essentially 
practice-based phenomenon: free speech practices10 play a “foundational and neces-
sary (though not sufficient) role in ensuring that citizens develop the capacity for 
moral agency and have the opportunities and information necessary to discharge their 
moral duties.”11 Thus, the most fundamental political argument for protecting free 
speech arises “both out of respect for the fundamental moral rights of the person 
and because a well-functioning system of social cooperation and justice presupposes 
that the citizenry, by and large, have active, well-developed moral personalities.”12 
According to Shiffrin, the “thinker-based” approach does not contradict predomi-
nant alternative theories (such as those that justify free speech based on the funda-
mental interests of listeners, the interests of speakers, the tendency of free speech to 
elicit truth, or the importance of free speech to democracy). Rather, it is bedrock on 
which each of these alternative theories can be justified.13 
Shiffrin’s “thinker-based” approach justifies more than the institutions, prac-
tices and norms of free speech. Like the duty of non-subversion, the “thinker-based” 
approach seems to apply to any social institution or practice that is integral to the 
development of moral agency, whether informal (like the practice of promising) or 
formal (like the legal institution of contract and universities).14 The value of moral 
autonomy both establishes the main point of these institutions and grounds duties 
for those who live under them. 
                                                          
 9. On Shiffrin’s “content-based” approach, whether it is wrong to misrepresent one’s mental content to the 
murderer at the door depends on what, exactly, one misrepresents. Misrepresenting information “about the victim’s 
location” is not wrongful, since speaking accurately and sincerely would “assist the murderer. . . in carrying out a 
crime.” Id. at 32. However, “a permission to misrepresent tout court to the Murderer at the Door would place him in 
something like solitary confinement without a marked exit.” Id. at 38.   
 10. For the sake of exposition, suppose that practices and institutions are constituted in part by norms. See, e.g., 
Michael Rescorla, Assertion and its Constitutive Norms, 79 PHIL. & PHENOM. RES. 98, 101 (2009) (“[A] norm is consti-
tutive of a practice [if and only if] one must obey the norm to engage correctly in the practice.”). Norms are clusters 
of normative attitudes regarding normative principles that are accepted within practice or institution and “a significant 
proportion of” the participants in that practice or institution “have certain attitudes” that track (and are prompted 
by) the content of the normative principle, under standards of publicity. See Stephen R. Galoob & Adam Hill, Norms, 
Attitudes, and Compliance, 50 TULSA L. REV. 613, 615 (2015) (citing GEOFFREY BRENNAN, ET AL., EXPLAINING NORMS 
613, 615 (2013)).  
 11. SPEECH MATTERS, supra note 1, at 92; see also id. at 80 (“[T]he foundation of free speech protection is that 
freedom of speech is necessary for the development and maintenance of the self qua thinker, for freedom of thought, 
and for discharging other aspects of our moral relations.”)  
 12. Id. at 92.  
 13. Id. at 85.  
 14. Id. at 70 (contending that contract law is social institution dedicated to facilitating and enforcing promises 
and is a component of joint project of creating and fairly distributing social resources).  
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B. Internalization and “Substantive Virtue Theory” 
Yet for those who live under social structures in which autonomy can be real-
ized, non-subversion is not enough. Throughout Speech Matters and elsewhere, 
Shiffrin envisions a more rigorous standard of engaging with the norms of these in-
stitutions and practices. Living up to this standard requires an agent to internalize 
both the ends of these practices or institutions and the propositions that those ends 
entail. For an agent who internalizes an institution’s ends and their entailments, there 
is normative pressure to deliberate and act in ways that are consistent with these ends. 
Likewise, acting in ways that violate these ends is grounds for a serious form of crit-
icism, regardless of whether formal rules actually hold the agent to these norms. 
Although Shiffrin does not extensively discuss internalization in Speech Matters, 
the importance of this phenomenon is most readily apparent in Chapter 6, “Sincerity 
and Institutional Values.” There, Shiffrin identifies universities and the state as insti-
tutions that “do not merely deliver goods and services but have special commitments 
to moral ends that in turn affect how they may pursue those ends.”15 These special 
moral ends, in turn, constrain those who operate within these institutions (like re-
searchers) or act on their behalf (like police officers). According to Shiffrin, both 
universities and the police have special epistemic ends related to the pursuit of the 
truth. These epistemic ends give rise to specific responsibilities for institutional ac-
tors—for example, prohibitions on investigative lies by the police16 and special duties 
of sincerity that preclude university researchers from engaging in deception as part 
of research.17 Since these prohibitions and duties are implicit in the ends of the insti-
tutions themselves, they apply to institutional actors regardless of whether external 
(or even institutional) rules enact or enforce them. 
How could a special duty apply to someone in virtue of a specific role, even 
though the law or the institution’s rules do not expressly impose it? Although Shiffrin 
does not directly discuss this question in Speech Matters, she has addressed it in prior 
work. For example, in a previous article Shiffrin appeals to a “substantive virtue the-
ory” that “in a well-ordered society, citizens accept the principles of justice as well as 
their major justifications.”18 On this approach, it is not enough to identify the ethical 
and political principles that govern people; it is also necessity to examine various 
“beliefs, habits, dispositions, motives, attitudes, and behaviors” that follow from 
these principles.19 Some of these subjective considerations may help realize the di-
rectives of political principles.20 Others arise out of the need to publicly justify these 
principles to others.21 
                                                          
 15. Id. at 223.  
 16. SPEECH MATTERS, supra note 1, at 194-98. 
 17. Id. at 214-21.  
 18. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Incentives, Motives, and Talents, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 111, 113 (2010).  
 19. Id. at 113.  
 20. Id. at 114.  
 21. Id. at 115.  
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Shiffrin introduces this “substantive virtue theory” methodology while inter-
vening in a debate among political philosophers about whether principles of distrib-
utive justice apply only to social institutions (as John Rawls argued),22 or also to the 
decisions or behaviors of individuals (as G.A. Cohen argued).23 According to those 
who favor the latter position, “[i]f a citizen internalizes [the principle of distributive 
justice] and applies it to her own economic activity, then she will demand only an 
equal salary to others and perform as productively as possible” in order to help realize 
this principle.24 Shiffrin’s proposal circumvents the debate between Rawls and Co-
hen. Regardless of whether the principles of distributive justice apply directly to the 
actions of people, people accept these principles and their justifications.25 If part of 
the justification for the principles of distributive justice is the proposition that “talents 
are arbitrary from a moral point of view,”26 then citizens will not seek to exploit their 
own talents “on pain of inconsistency,”27 since if “possession of a talent is arbitrary,” 
then “it cannot serve as the reason for an unequal distribution.”28 If someone acts in 
a way that supposes otherwise, then she violates a principle that she has embraced as 
her own.29 
In Speech Matters, Shiffrin utilizes something like this “substantive virtue theory” 
methodology to examine the situation of actors in institutions that have special ends. 
For example, Shiffrin effectively argues that a police officer should accept the funda-
mental justification for police departments, including the epistemic goals that such 
departments serve. Having accepted this justification, she should not utilize investi-
gative lies, which contradict and subvert these goals.30 Likewise, a researcher who 
understands the special epistemic values that justify universities will not engage in 
deception as a research tool, since such a practice is inconsistent with these values.31 
                                                          
 22. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 6-9, 47-9 (1999 ed.).  
 23. See, e.g., G.A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 8-11 and ch. 3 (2009). See also Brian Berkey, Double 
Counting, Moral Rigorism, and Cohen’s Critique of Rawls: A Response to Alan Thomas, 124 MIND 849, 854 (2015) (“If we 
accept what appears to be Rawls’s considered view, and understand distributive justice in terms of pure procedural 
justice, then the view that the principles of justice do not apply directly to individuals seems not only plausible, but 
perhaps unavoidable.
 
If, on the other hand, we follow Cohen, and understand distributive justice as essentially a 
matter of the actual distribution of benefits and burdens among individuals, then Institutionalism begins to look 
somewhat less plausible, for reasons provided by Cohen, among others.”).  
 24. Shiffrin, supra note 18, at 118.  
 25. Id. at 113.  
 26. Id. at 121.  
 27. Id. at 121 n.18.  
 28. Id. at 125.  
 29. Shiffrin, supra note 18, at 131 (“If it is a cornerstone of our conception of equality that we regard ourselves 
as equal in virtue of our mutual possession of our higher-order capacities . . . then it is a big deal consciously to permit 
an irrelevant quality to be the basis for a claim to social resources. To do so is to affirm one conception of equality 
but through our actions to subvert that conception, and, in addition, to deliver a rather different symbolic message 
about our mutual relations to each other.”) 
 30. SPEECH MATTERS, supra note 1, at 198 (“[S]tate authorities, at least in a democracy, must aspire to be relevant 
epistemic authorities on the law and on at least that aspect of morality embodied in law. We should be able to rely 
on their transmissions about the content of law, legally relevant morality, and legally relevant facts.”); 
 31. Id. at 217 (contending that a “posture of open[n]ess” among researchers “is essential to ensuring the possi-
bility of discovering and confirming the truth, to inculcating the skills necessary for students to continue these inves-
tigations, and to give citizens sufficient grounds for confidence in the university’s results as sincere, responsible 
conclusions about matters of individual and public concern. This conception of the university seems to exclude lying 
to research subjects, even if those misrepresentations will be later corrected.”)   
5
Galoob: Living Up to and Under Norms
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2016
 472 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:467 
Implicit in both of Shiffrin’s arguments is the (sensible) contention that someone 
derogates his or her duty by occupying an institutional role while failing to accept the 
justification for that role. 
Shiffrin’s case for internalization has implications wider than the police station 
or the psych lab. For example, Shiffrin sees participants in communicative practices 
as having a generic duty of sincerity, which (she argues) arises out of the role of those 
practices in facilitating moral agency.32 Likewise, Shiffrin identifies a norm of fidelity 
that arises out of the practice of promising.33 This fidelity norm supports Shiffrin’s 
conclusion, in Chapter 2, that promises made under duress exert some moral force 
on the promisor, regardless of whether such promises are legally enforceable.34 In 
both instances, the agent should both behave in accordance with the norm and take 
on the norm as an important goal as part of accepting the fundamental justification 
for the practice. 
C. “Accommodation” and Limits to Demands 
For Shiffrin, moral agency is both limited and fragile. Within a “complex, inter-
dependent community,” respecting the moral agency of others requires not only re-
specting their rights, but also doing one’s part to “creat[e the] conditions for [auton-
omy’s] meaningful exercise.”35 Each of us must not only “tolerate some level of 
burdensome other-regarding behavior,” but also “subsidize some such behavior.”36 
Moreover, everyone’s moral agency is prone to weakness and failure.37 To expect 
perfection out of others is to deny their humanity and to hold them to a standard 
more demanding than is justified. 
In light of these realities, Shiffrin argues for a robust form of accommodation, 
according to which “third parties or the community. . . shoulder some burdens asso-
ciated with [an agent’s] choice, rather than compelling the individual agent to shoul-
der [those burdens] entirely herself.”38 Shiffrin sees such choice-protecting accom-
modation not as an entreaty to the haves, but rather as a principle of political morality. 
Even when our fellow citizens display some degree of weakness, they do not cease 
to have lives to lead or to generate claims on us. Accommodation is an imperative, a 
way of realizing everyone’s equal interest in pursuing a rewarding life. As Shiffrin puts 
it, accommodation is part of “a minimal willingness to behave cooperatively, do one’s 
part, treat others equally and with respect” that is a “prerequisite of eligibility for 
demanding that one is entitled to equal treatment by others.”39 In the moral domain, 
                                                          
 32. Id. at 193.  
 33. Id. at 70.  
 34. Id. at 65.  
 35. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 
239 (2000).  
 36. Id.  
 37. SPEECH MATTERS, supra note 1, at 175.  
 38. Id. at 159.  
 39. Id. at 169; see also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 1214, 1223-4 (2010) (“Being a moral agent does not merely involve compliance with a set of legal directives. 
It also demands active engagement and understanding of the situations of others; standards of these sorts require 
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accommodation entails not only helping others, but also accepting their imperfec-
tions. Accommodation is also animating principle for social and political institutions, 
one that citizens of a just society should internalize.40 
The imperative of accommodation constrains what others may demand of an 
agent. For example, while it is acceptable to punish and condemn those who subvert 
valuable social institutions and practices, there are no “comprehensive suspended 
contexts” in which none of the background norms of communication (like sincerity) 
hold regarding a particular person. When addressing the murderer at the door, one 
may not lie to him about everything.41 Shiffrin denies that anyone is ever an outcast, 
someone whose interests do not matter at all and who gives rise to no claims on 
others.42 The prospect of outcasts is inconsistent with respect for the moral agency 
of those (like the murderer at the door) who do wrong, since outcasting denies those 
wrongdoers access to institutions and practices that are essential to realizing their 
moral agency. 
This link between accommodation and the limits on what states may demand 
informs Shiffrin’s discussion (in Chapters 4 and 5) of the regulation of “pure” lies. A 
“pure” lie is a lie whose wrongfulness cannot be appraised in terms of its deceptive-
ness or its falsity.43 Shiffrin focuses on pure lies in order to establish what is wrong 
with lying as such. Many lies are deceptive and false, and these considerations help 
explain why those lies are wrong. But not all lies deceive and, on Shiffrin’s definition, 
not all lies are false.44 If a lie does not deceive, is it still wrong and worth regulating? 
To appreciate the wrongfulness of pure lies, Shiffrin focuses on the category of 
autobiographical lies, or “lies about one’s personal characteristics, or accomplish-
ments in public.”45 Shiffrin contends that pure autobiographical lies (that is, lies 
about one’s past that do not actually deceive the listener) are wrongful and do not 
demand free speech protection. Such lies share a common feature with deceptive and 
                                                          
such engagement and thereby directly promote moral agency. Being treated with respect sometimes requires that 
others respect your boundaries by steering clear of them. But in many cases, it involves actually being the subject of 
respectful and sympathetic attention and deliberation.. . . [I]n many circumstances, respectful treatment involves oth-
ers apprehending and appreciating your needs and interests and responding to them as such.”).  
 40. SPEECH MATTERS, supra note 1, at 181 (“If our legal actions and omissions generate a climate in which citizens 
justifiably internalize the sense that their belonging and their equal status is not contingent upon their perfection, 
then this demonstration succeeds, even if the justified belief is not the product of a deliberate, explicitly conveyed 
message.”) To be sure, Shiffrin envisions a limit to the types of actions that call for accommodation, arguing that we 
have strong reason not to accommodate actions that involve “particular intended victims of harm, or where the 
damage to public interests [from accommodation] is or would be significant…” Id. at 177.  
 41. Id. at 43 (“[O]ne would go very wrong by volunteering gratuitously to the Murderer at the Door that one does 
not regard the context as justifiably suspended and that one really is telling the truth.”). 
 42. Id. at 45 (“[T]here are actions we think we cannot perform and rights that are not forfeited, even by wrong-
doers, although our abstention from these actions may represent a missed opportunity to prevent harm.”). 
 43. Id. at 116.  
 44. Shiffrin defines a lie as “[a]n intentional assertion by A to B of a proposition P such that (1) A does not 
believe P, and (2) A is aware that A does not believe P, and (3) A intentionally presents P in a manner or context that 
objectively manifests A’s intention that P is to take and treat P as an accurate representation of A’s belief.” Id., at 12 
(internal citations omitted).  On this definition, it is possible for A’s lie to fail to deceive B. It is also possible for A’s 
assertion of P to be true and also a lie, so long as conditions (1)-(3) are satisfied.   
 45. SPEECH MATTERS, supra note 1, at 119. 
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false lies: each subverts social practices of communication by “abus[ing] the mecha-
nism of direct communication and threaten[ing] the basis of our testimonial trust 
with one another.”46 Pure autobiographical lies also violate the freestanding duty of 
sincerity that is incumbent on all participants in social communication practices.47 A 
speaker who has internalized this duty of sincerity would not engage in autobiograph-
ical lying. 
At the same time, Shiffrin contends, pure autobiographical lies should not be 
criminally prohibited.48 Shiffrin makes the case against criminalization not in terms 
of free speech values, but rather in terms of accommodation. “[A]lthough free speech 
principles pose no barrier to regulating pure autobiographical lies, declining to regu-
late them may nevertheless represent a warranted form of accommodation that con-
veys an important sort of inclusivity and recognition of the sort of agents we are.”49 
For Shiffrin, pure autobiographical lies are paradigmatically the products of agential 
limitations—the “flaws and foibles” of others.50 Criminally prohibiting such lies 
would violate the imperative of accommodation by failing “publicly to manifest com-
passion and understanding” for the shortcomings of the speaker.51 
II. SHIFFRIN’S INSIGHT 
What is it to live up to the norms that comprise legal, political, and moral insti-
tutions? What are the limits to the demands or expectations that can be imposed on 
those who live under such institutions? It is natural to think that the answers to these 
two questions run in tandem, with the content of the norms being identical to the 
permissible expectations of or demands on those living under them. For example, if 
the standards for living up to political norms are rigorous, then it makes sense that 
the state may impose rigorous demands on those subject to its authority. On the 
other hand, if the standards for living up to political norms are lax, then it makes 
sense that the demands on those living under such norms are also lax. 
What I will call “Shiffrin’s Insight” is that the answers to these questions can 
and should come apart—the standards for living up to legal, moral, and political 
norms should be rigorous, yet a narrower scope of expectations or demands should 
apply to those who live under these institutions. Shiffrin’s Insight is captured by her 
contention that a “constrained practice of accommodating some moral wrongs” and 
other shortcomings of moral agency “dovetails with a plausible interpretation of po-
litical equality, one that demands a high degree of willing compliance with moral prin-
ciples, but not perfect compliance.”52 
                                                          
 46. Id. at 116. 
 47. Id. at 119. 
 48. Shiffrin’s discussion of pure autobiographical lies is centered around the Stolen Valor Act, 18 U.S.C. §704 
(2006), a federal criminal statute that prohibited falsehoods regarding military service and awards and was recently 
struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court as violating the First Amendment. SPEECH MATTERS, supra note 1, at 120 
(citing United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)).  
 49. Id. at 162.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 163.  
 52. Id. at 158. 
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Before examining the components of Shiffrin’s Insight, some background 
might be helpful. Norms might vary in their laxity or rigor along several dimensions. 
A norm can be formulated as a demand or as a permission.53 Norms can vary in their 
relative priority to others of an agent’s projects.54 Some norms apply directly to a 
person, while the application of other norms is mediated through institutions.55 
Norms might also vary in terms of what they govern. For example, complying with 
some norms might be entirely a matter of behaving in a particular way.56 For other 
norms, compliance implicates both behavior and deliberation, such that someone 
who behaves in the required way but fails to deliberate appropriately fails to comply 
with the norm.57 
A. Living Up to Norms 
For Shiffrin, the norms of autonomy-facilitating institutions (e.g., the practices 
of communication, the practice of promising, and the university) impose rigorous 
demands. As a straightforward matter, these institutions regulate how participants 
behave. Yet living up to these institutions is more than a matter of behaving in the 
appointed ways. A participant must also support these institutions. Doing so requires, 
at a minimum, not free riding on58 or subverting59 these institutions. 
Living up to the norms of such institutions also has a significant cognitive di-
mension.60 On Shiffrin’s “substantive virtue theory,” as discussed above, a citizen 
should internalize some of the ends and norms of social and political institutions as 
                                                          
 53. For example, norms of legal ethics might classify the maintenance of client confidences as required or as 
optional (that is, neither required nor forbidden). Stephen R. Galoob & Su Li, Are Legal Ethics Ethical? A Survey 
Experiment, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 481, 502, 513 (2013) (discussing variation in status of confidentiality across 
legal ethics regimes).   
 54. For example, the moral norm of beneficence might vary in the demands that it imposes, on some formula-
tions leaving room for an agent to pursue her important projects even though others are in severe need and on other 
formulations not. See generally LIAM MURPHY, MORAL DEMANDS IN NONIDEAL THEORY chs. 2-4 (2000); SAMUEL 
SCHEFFLER, HUMAN MORALITY ch. 2 (1992).  
 55. This is the crux of the debate between Rawls and Cohen about the application of principles of distributive 
justice, described supra at notes 18-29 and accompanying text.  
 56. See BRENNAN, ET AL., supra note 10, at 50 (“[F]ormal norms typically involve normative principles that apply 
only to actions.”); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 24 (2000) (“[S]ocial norms are always about observed 
behavior.”).  
 57. See Galoob & Hill, supra note 10, at 629 (“[S]ome social norms are deliberation-sensitive. Complying with 
these norms requires both behaving and deliberating in specific ways.”). 
 58. SPEECH MATTERS, supra note 1, at 7 (“To lie for personal convenience seems to violate fundamental norms 
of equality and interpersonal respect by wrongfully treating oneself as more important than one’s interlocutor, 
whether because one thereby makes an exception for oneself to crucial rules of communication, because one thereby 
attempts to gain an unfair epistemic advantage over another, or because one attempts to manipulate another’s trust 
for one’s own private ends.”). 
 59. Id. at 11-12 (portraying lying as a “special way” that duties of sincerity and truthfulness “are subverted,” which 
“might constitute a form of harm to self and to humanity, as well as an insult and, potentially, a harm to the recipient 
in particular.”); see also Niko Kolodny and R. Jay Wallace, Promises and Practices Revisited, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 119, 132 
(2003) (participants in valuable social practices have a generic duty not to “exploit or undermine” those practices).   
 60. On the cognitive dimensions of legal norms generally (and norms of promising and fiduciary loyalty in par-
ticular), see Stephen Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Intentions, Compliance, and Fiduciary Obligations, 20 LEGAL THEORY 106, 
107-18 (2014); Ethan J. Leib & Stephen Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820, 1827-38 
(2016).  
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part of accepting the fundamental justification for these institutions.61 This internal-
ization rules out a variety of ways that the citizen might take advantage of social prac-
tices. For example, it precludes a citizen from taking advantage of gaps in norms 
where such exploitation would be based on a maxim for action that is inconsistent 
with the system’s rational justification.62 Shiffrin’s depiction of the cognitive engage-
ment required to live up to these norms resembles the kind of allegiance that many 
communitarian and “associative” political theories call for.63 Betraying ends that you 
hold licenses a serious form of criticism, as does missing the point of ends that you 
do (or should) hold. 
These rigorous requirements for living up to norms support a series of seem-
ingly harsh verdicts in Speech Matters. The old man who invokes his nonexistent mili-
tary service record during a city council meeting commits a serious wrong, even if 
nobody actually believes (or even listens to) his war stories.64 So, too, might the vic-
tim of a robbery who, after “remonstrat[ing] with the robber to give up his life of 
crime and instead to enter rehab, promis[es] to help him gain entry to a program the 
next day,” all the while never intending to provide such assistance.65 The researcher 
who uses deception in order to conduct an experiment that will be written up in a 
scholarly article betrays the fundamental epistemic goals of universities, regardless of 
whether this practice is widespread or condoned by an institutional review board.66 
The police officer subverts the special role of police in “our scheme of epistemic 
moral cooperation” when, suspending doubts about a suspect’s guilt, he uses decep-
tive tactics to trick the suspect into incriminating herself during interrogation.67 Each 
of these agents can be accused not only of having violated a norm but also of having 
betrayed values that they hold important. 
                                                          
 61. See supra note 18.   
 62. SPEECH MATTERS, supra note 1, at 26; see also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Bedrock, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 242, 
247 (2016) (“[W]here [testimonial] reliance is based on listeners taking a risk in the veracity of speakers, or on listeners 
being able to verify their veracity through independent means,” lying indicates “either (1) that our reliance is spotty 
and dependent on what specific information we have about the speaker or (2) that this reliance is rationally unsup-
ported but rests on hope, denial, or a failure of alternatives. In these ways, lies will desiccate the rational quality and 
nature of our practices of trust, even if their form persists.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Simon Keller, Royce and Communitarianism, 2 THE PLURALIST 16 (2007) (“A central communitarian 
theme is the claim that loyalty to community is what makes ethical thinking possible and meaningful.”); Sibyl A. 
Schwarzenbach, On Civic Friendship, 107 ETHICS 97-8 (1996) (contending that philia, a “form of friendship” that citi-
zens in a just society experience for each other under which “they wish each other well for their own sake, do things 
for fellow citizens both individually and as a citizen body, and share in values, goals, and a sense of justice” is “an 
essential factor unifying even the just modern state.”); ANNA STILZ, LIBERAL LOYALTY 24 (2011) (“[C]itizens’ en-
dorsement of justice as an important value gives them perfectly sufficient reasons for allegiance to their state and for 
solidarity with their compatriots.”). 
 64. This description fits the facts of the Alvarez case that Shiffrin uses to illustrate her analysis of pure autobio-
graphical lies. SPEECH MATTERS, supra note 1, at 120-1.  
 65. Id. at 54. 
 66. Id. at 220 (researcher who utilizes deception “acts on a maxim that affirms presenting the false as though it 
were true with the aim that it be taken as true for the researcher’s purposes of furthering knowledge. Although the 
context is delineated, affirmation of that maxim seems in tension with a foundational commitment to sincere expres-
sion as an ethical and meaning-bestowing constraint on the pursuit of knowledge.”).   
 67. Id. at 194-199, 197.   
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Aside from the examples discussed in Speech Matters, many other institutional 
norms impose rigorous standards for living up. For example, the executive who de-
mands an exorbitant wage68 can be said to have missed the point of distributive (and, 
perhaps, social and political) equality. The criminal defense attorney who, in defend-
ing someone accused of rape, harshly cross-examines a complaining witness he 
knows to be telling the truth69 might be said to act on a maxim (“my client’s interest 
above the interests of justice”) that subverts the criminal justice system. So, too, 
might the prosecutor who utilizes the widespread tactic of “overcharging,” or “mul-
tiplying the number of accusations [against a single defendant]” or “charging a single 
offense at a higher level than the circumstances of the case seem to warrant” in order 
to maximize leverage during plea negotiations.70 Shiffrin’s logic suggests that all of 
these cases involve agents shirking or overlooking their responsibilities to just insti-
tutions. It is not enough to simply mind the rules or to avoid free riding. These actors 
make sure that their actions do not subvert such institutions. Sometimes, living up to 
these duties requires seeing the world in a new way. Failing to do so is failing to live 
up to the institution’s norms. 
B. Living Under Norms 
Although Shiffrin portrays the norms constituting social and political institu-
tions as demanding, she also sees limits to what those institutions may demand. In 
part, these limits align with restraints on state power that arise out of the liberal po-
litical tradition.71 However, the realities of moral agency provide another significant 
source of limitation. The fragility of agency and imperative of accommodation justify 
some tempering of the demands on those who live under social and political institu-
tions. 
Violating the norms of an institution usually licenses a severe form of criticism, 
or punishment, or both. However, Shiffrin’s logic suggests, a just state should treat 
norm violations that arise out of certain agential defects (most prominently, our 
“weaknesses as moral agents”)72 differently from those that do not. For example, the 
old man whose pure autobiographical lie violates norms of communicative sincerity 
should not be subject to prison or serious fines.73 Nor should the victim of robbery 
who utilizes a lying promise to the robber be legally held to that promise, regardless 
of whether the promise has moral value.74 Presumably, the agential frailties of the 
                                                          
 68. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 23, at 27-86.  
 69. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 
64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1474 (1966); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 150-1 (1988).  
 70. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 85-6 (1968).  
 71. See, e.g., Samuel Scheffler, Egalitarian Liberalism as Moral Pluralism (Part I), Supp. Vol. 79 ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y. 
229 (2005).  
 72. SPEECH MATTERS, supra note 1, at 175. 
 73. Id. at 122 (by “attaching criminal penalties to pure lies, authorizing up to a year of imprisonment if the lie 
concerned certain distinguished medals, such as the Purple Heart,” Stolen Valor Act “offended for its disproportion-
ate remedy.”).   
 74. Id. at 70 (“were the legal institution of contract to enforce promises made under duress in private suits be-
tween coercers and the coerced, it would throw the weight of the community behind the aims of the coercer, even 
though the moral argument for fidelity does not establish any moral right or claim to performance. Without such a 
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researcher who engages in experimental deception and the investment banker whose 
wage demands are inconsistent with distributive justice should also be accommo-
dated. 
Each of these cases involves a norm violation, yet each such violation arguably 
results from a defective exercise of moral agency. Rather than punishing violations 
of these norms and the subversion of these institutions, the appropriate response is 
to accommodate the defects of moral agency, to help the agent understand the sig-
nificance of his or her action.75 Thus, while Shiffrin construes the standards for living 
up to norms consistently with “thicker” accounts of political morality (like commu-
nitarianism and “civic friendship”), her account of what it takes to live under such 
norms is consistent with the limits on state demands favored by “thinner” political 
theories like libertarianism and classical liberalism. The limitations on moral agency 
explain any seeming tension between the standards for living up to and living under 
social institutions. 
Shiffrin’s Insight, then, is that considerations related to moral agency simulta-
neously call for norms of social and political institutions that are rigorous and de-
mands incumbent on those living under such institutions that are more limited. 
Shiffrin’s Insight differs from a more straightforward legal moralism, which construes 
the standards for living up to such norms as identical to the standards for living under 
them.76 Shiffrin’s Insight also differs from retributivist theories of the justification 
for criminal punishment, which see norm violations resulting from defective exercises 
of agency primarily as occasions for giving an agent what she deserves.77 For many 
retributivists, any accommodation of an agent’s weakness is demeaning,78 rather than 
a potential way of respecting his limitations (and our own). 
Shiffrin’s Insight is undeniably novel. Is it also persuasive? Answering this ques-
tion would take a career. However, Shiffrin’s influential (although controversial) work 
                                                          
claim, the community’s joining forces with the coercer seems (highly) inappropriate, given the injustice of the coerc-
ing agent’s behavior and the injustice of the circumstances the coercing agent created that elicited an agreement.”). 
 75. The same accommodation-based limitations would presumably not apply to abuses by state officials, as in 
the case of investigative lies by police officers or overcharging by prosecutors.  
 76. In criminal law, legal moralism is the view that “the state can and should criminalize immorality, as such, 
independently of whether the immorality involves harm.” See David O. Brink, Retributivism and Legal Moralism, 25 
RATIO JURIS 496 (2012). Among private law theorists, legal moralism is tantamount to what Shiffrin calls the “reflec-
tive approach,” according to which “interpersonal morality” operates as a “template for legal rules” and “the law 
should reflect everyday moral judgments whenever possible, whether because this is the nature of law or because, as 
a matter of political philosophy, it is what law should aim to do.” Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract 
and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 713 (2007).  
 77. See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349, 370-1 (1992) (“Culpable 
agency is the very heart of retributive justice.”).   
 78. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 149 (1997) (to refuse to punish 
or blame another for his wrongdoing is to deny his “capacity to will and reason—- and thus to be and do evil. Far 
from evincing fellow-feeling and the allowing of others to participate in our moral life, it excludes them as less than 
persons.”). 
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on promissory morality and contract theory utilizes something like Shiffrin’s In-
sight.79 So does her work on distributive justice.80 Shiffrin’s Insight also seems, to 
this reviewer at least, to provide a powerful explanation of many foundational debates 
in professional ethics.81 Seana Valentine Shiffrin’s contribution in Speech Matters, then, 
has implications far wider than the matter of speech. 
                                                          
 79. See, for example, Shiffrin’s “accommodationist approach” to the proper relationship between contract law 
and promissory morality, on which “legal rules should be sensitive to the demands placed on moral agents so that 
law-abiding moral agents do not, as a regular matter, face substantial burdens on the development and expression of 
moral agency.” Shiffrin, supra note 76, at 712, 715.   
 80. See supra, notes 18-29 and accompanying text.   
 81. Indeed, Shiffrin’s accommodationist position regarding contract law and promissory morality provides a fresh 
way to respond to Charles Fried’s famous question “Can a good lawyer can be a good person?” See Charles Fried, 
The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1975). 
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